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PURCHASE OF CONSUMER PAPER AND SUBJECTION TO
COLLATERAL DEFENSES
Benjamin Geva*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purchase of commercial paper' issued in return for consumer
goods2 [hereinafter referred to as consumer paper] is a common and
wide-spread sales financing practice.3 Various judicial techniques
and legislative schemes have been employed to disqualify purchas-
ers of consumer paper4 from becoming holders in due course
[hereinafter referred to as HDC],5 thus rendering these purchasers
subject to defenses to the instrument based upon consumer dissatis-
faction with the goods.' Underlying the denial of HDC sttus to
purchasers of consumer paper are the following premises: (1) the
sale of consumer goods is not a commercial transaction and should
* LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1975; Lec-
turer in Law, The University of Chicago, 1976/77; Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto, 1977/78.
1. Covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code), 1962 Official Text, Article
3. For our purposes, "commercial paper" means a negotiable instrument as defined in U.C.C.
§3-104.
The reason for citing the 1962 version of the Code rather than the 1972 Official Text is the
wider adoption of the former in the American jurisdictions. Yet, the 1972 changes do not affect
the conclusions of this paper. Cf. note 27 infra (changes in § 9-318(3) designed to eliminate
difficulties in the 1962 Code).
2. Defined by U.C.C. § 9-109(1) as goods which "are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes."
3. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC,
44 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 272, 274 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Littlefield]. For a discussion of the
distinctions between the markets for consumer paper and commercial paper see id. at 285.
4. Expressions such as "consumer purchases financer," "financer" and "purchaser of
consumer paper" are used in this article interchangeably.
5. Defihed in U.C.C. § 3-302(1) as a holder (U.C.C. § 1-201(20)) who takes the instrument
for value (U.C.C. § 3-303), in good faith (U.C.C. § 1-201(19)) and without notice (U.C.C. §
1-201(25), (27)) of any defect relating to it (U.C.C. § 3-304). The rights of a HDC are governed
by U.C.C. § 3-305 and are characterized by freedom from most defenses of parties with whom
he has not dealt.
6. For a guide to the enormous amount of literature dealing with this issue, see REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES,
ch. 3 nn.58-77 (December 1972) (chairman: R. Braucher, succeeded by I.M. Millstein). See
also Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival or
Reformation? 60 CORNELL L. REv. 503 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rohner].
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not be governed by commercial law;7 (2) usually a close connection
exists between sellers and consumer purchases financers;8 (3) there
is a basic inequality between consumers and the commercial com-
munity;9 (4) the maintenance of consumer defenses against sellers
alone is inadequate;'" and (5) the desired goals of minimizing costs
of seller misconduct and internalizing the remaining costs in the
price of consumer credit should be accomplished by allowing con-
sumer defenses against purchasers financers.1
The subject of this article, however, is not the consumer's right
7. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1101
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore]; Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel":
Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defenses Clauses in Consumer Sales,
29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667, 672 n.18 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Murphy]. But see Kripke,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 471
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Kripke].
8. See generally Feltham and Feltham, Retail Installment Sales Financing-Rights of
the Assignee-Endorsee-Identification of the Finance Company with the Dealer to Protect
the Buyer, 40 CAN. B. REv. 461, 479-81 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Feltham]; Mooney,
Judicial and Statutory Limitation on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course" in Consumer
Transactions; 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 90, 99 (1969)-70). For a discussion of the evolu-
tion of the close connection pattern, see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer
Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 63-64 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Good Faith Purchase]. For an examination of the pretensions of closely connected
purchases financers who seek to qualify as HDC's, see McEwen, Economic Issues in State
Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rv. 387, 401 (1967); Comment,
Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 395, 414 n.147 and accompanying text (1966). Usually sellers and financers
operate together without considering the interests of the consumer. See Littlefield, supra
note 3, at 274.
9. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1101; Kripke, supra note 7, at 472; Kripke, Chattel Paper as
Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1219 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Chattel Paper]; Schuchman, Consumfr Credit by Adhesion Contracts,
Pts. I&I, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 130, 281 (1962). The consumer executing the notes seldom
realizes that his signature might amount to an obligation to pay regardless of the seller's
performance. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 671 n.16; Eldridge, The Holder-in-Due Course
and the Installment Buyer of Consumer Goods, 36 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 368, 376 (1968). The
typical consumer may be characterized as a low-moderate income earner whose inferior
bargaining power vis-a-vis the business community necessitates adequate protection. See
Schricker, Unfair Competition and Consumer Protection in Western Europe, 1 I.I.C. 415, 434
(1970).
10. This is due to "the burden of inertia of litigation" and the "strain of current cash
outlay." Littlefield, supra note 3, at 285. Contra, Chattel Paper, supra note 9, at 1215-16. But
cf. Kripke, supra note 7, at 471-73 (modifying his earlier views).
11. See generally Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L. Rv.
1409, 1411-17 (1972); Littlefield, supra note 3, at 280-85 (referring to the policies of "policing
the retailer" and "spreading costs and assuming risks").
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to assert defenses arising directly from the underlying transaction.
Rather, the present concern is the maintenance of "collateral defen-
ses," i.e., claims and defenses which arise against the seller out of a
transaction separate and independent12 from the financed contract
for sale, ' 3 but which are nevertheless applicable to the seller's claim
upon the financed contract. The precise issue is whether these col-
lateral defenses are available to the consumer against purchasers of
consumer paper who are not HDCs.
In analyzing this issue, it will be argued in Section II that the
question should be resolved according to the law of instruments.
Section III will then be devoted to the presentation of a number of
arguments in support of the conclusion that present commercial and
consumer credit legislation may be interpreted as subjecting pur-
chasers of consumer paper to collateral defenses. 4
If. CONSUMER PAPER RETAINS ITS IDENTITY As AN INSTRUMENT
A. The Inapplicability of U. C.C. § 9-318
Two assumptions are basic to this discussion of consumer paper
and subjection to collateral defenses. First, consumer paper retains
its identity as an instrument. 5 Second, the issue of whether a pur-
chaser of consumer paper is subject to collateral defenses ought to
be resolved in the light of the law applicable to instruments rather
than the law of chattel paper.
The law of instruments is applicable to consumer paper despite
the fact that the typical financed consumer sale involves the con-
temporaneous execution of a security agreement" and a negotiable
12. See note 43 infra.
13. "Contract for sale" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-106(1). Unless indicated otherwise, such
expressions as "contract for sale", "sale agreement", "sale", "agreement", "contract" and
"transaction" will be used here interchangeably.
14. The present inquiry will be confined to a conceptual analysis of the legal relations and
will avoid a functional examination of policies and problems of risk allocation.
15. "Instrument" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g) as "a negotiable instrument [defined
in Section 3-104] . . . or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money
and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type Which is in ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. ... Cf.
U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(e)(defining "instrument" for the purpose of Article 3).
16. "Security agreement" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h) as "an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest" (defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(37)).
1977]
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instrument,17 a "group of writings" which when taken together con-
stitutes "chattel paper."18 As explained hereinafter"9 in dealing with
rights upon an instrument which constitutes part of chattel paper,
the signer of the instrument is not an "account debtor," the name
given by the Code to the person who is obligated on chattel paper. 0
Therefore, U.C.C. § 9-318, being confined to the rights of an account
debtor,2' does not govern the rights of a person who is obligated on
such an instrument, and hence the section cannot constitute a di-
rect authority for his power to assert collateral defenses against an
assignee who seeks to enforce the obligation embodied in the instru-
ment.22 Instead, the rights of this obligor are determined by the law
applicable to instruments. Indeed, apart from the rights that stem
from security interests in instruments, Article 9 of the Code does not
purport to deal with the rights and liabilities of parties thereto: "an
instrument which is secured by chattel paper is itself part of chattel
paper, while also retaining its identity as an instrument." 23
The exclusion from the definition of "account debtor" of the per-
son who is obligated on chattel paper in his capacity as the signer
of the instrument is required to maintain harmony between the
provisions of Article 9 and two fundamental rules underlying the
nature of instruments. The first rule is that an obligation evidenced
17. See Feltham, supra note 8, at 461; Good Faith Purchase, supra note 8, at 74.
18. See U.C.C. § 9-105()(b)(last sentence). See also § 9-304(l); 1972 Official Text, § 9-
308, Comment 4, § 9-309, Comment 2.
19. See notes 23-33 infra, and accompanying text.
20. "Account debtor" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a). The definition does not refer to
an obligor upon an instrument, but it encompasses "the person who is obligated on . ..
chattel paper" (emphasis added). Because an instrument which is executed contemporaneous
with a security agreement is viewed by the Code as part of chattel paper; id.; the person who
is obligated on it might be considered an account debtor. But see notes 23-33 infra and
accompanying text.
21. It should be noted that § 9-318(1) which deals with defenses of an account debtor
against an assignee applies only when an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses as
provided in § 9-206(1) is not involved. However, denying HDC status to purchasers of con-
sumer paper amounts to "a different rule for buyers . ..of consumer goods" within the
purview of § 9-206 (1) so as to hold such agreements unenforceable and hence to hold § 9-
318(1) applicable.
22. U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b) provides that the rights of an assignee are subject to collateral
defenses of the account debtor. Whether "assignee" is broad enough to cover also a holder of
an instrument will not be determined here. For definitions of "assignee" and "assignment,"
see BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 152, et seq. (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
23. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g), Comment 3.
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by an instrument is merged into the instrument,24 rather than the
instrument becoming part of the obligation.25 Taking a negotiable
instrument for an underlying obligation has the effect of suspending
the obligation. The discharge of the underlying obligation is an
incident to the discharge of the liability upon the instrument and
can effectively be given only by the holder of the instrument. Hence,
when an obligation on an instrument is sought to be enforced, the
additional capacity of the obligor as "account debtor" is beyond the
issues that are before the court. The obligor is sued as a person who
is obligated on an instrument, rather than on chattel paper, whether
or not the holder of the instrument also took the security agreement.
The range of permissible defenses against the claim is therefore
determined by the law applicable to the obligation upon the instru-
ment, rather than by the law which governs the obligation upon the
underlying contract. Whether the latter law can be triggered by the
former law is nonetheless an entirely different question.
The second fundamental rule is that an obligation which is em-
bodied in an instrument is "reified" or "thingnified", 5 i.e., is trans-
ferred by delivery of the instrument, with or without any necessary
endorsement, rather than by mere agreement or notification. Unlike
an assignee of chattel paper who is entitled to collect from the
obligor under § 9-318(3) by giving him notice of the assignment,27 a
transferee of an instrument must rely on his possession of the
paper.2 Likewise, while under § 9-318(3) chattel paper can be gar-
24. See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b). " . . . [Tihe obligation [evidenced by the instrument] is
suspended pro tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its
presentment" (emphasis added). Id.
25. This appears to be the case under U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b). See note 18 supra, and
accompanying text.
26. See J. FALCONBRDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 489-90 (2d ed. 1954).
27. "Account" in U.C.C. § 9-318(3) should not be limited to its definition in § 9-106 but
should rather be construed to include all choses in action on which an account debtor is
obligated, including chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-318, Comment 3; 1972 Official Text § 9-
318(3); Appendix to the 1972 Official Text, Reason for 1972 change of § 9-318 (second para-
graph).
28. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text. See also U.C.C. § 3-603(1). The liability
of a party to an instrument is discharged "to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the
holder. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Possession is a prerequisite to acquiring a holder
status. U.C.C. § 1-201(20). For a discussion of the assignment of rights upon instruments
without their delivery, see W. E. BRrrrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BmLs AND NoTEs, 120
nn.12-16 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1961); Scheid v. Shields, 269 Or. 236, 524 P.2d 1209
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nished by creditors of a secured party by mere notification to the
account debtor, without reaching the paper itself, an obligation
embodied in an instrument cannot be garnished unless the paper is
seized. 9
The inapplicability of U.C.C. § 9-318 to rights upon instruments
which are part of chattel paper is further demonstrated in instances
where HDC status is not denied." If by virtue of § 9-318(3) an
obligor on an instrument, which constitutes part of chattel paper,
must pay the assignee when he receives notice of the assignment,
he runs the risk that the instrument be separated from the "group
of writings" and reach the hands of a HDC31 against whom the
defense of payment cannot be asserted.32 Of course, this obligor will
not have to pay an assignee merely upon receiving notice of the
assignment if § 9-318 does not apply to situations where instruments
are involved. 3
B. The Effect of the FTC Holder in Due Course Trade
Regulation Rule
A recent Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule34
makes it "unfair or a deceptive act or practice" for a seller to take
or receive a "consumer credit contract" which fails to contain the
following provision: "Any holder of this consumer credit contract is
subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could assert
against the seller. . . ."3 Because "consumer credit contract"" is
(1974). However, under § 3-603(2) payment to an assignee without consent to the holder will
not discharge the payor.
29. See U.C.C. § 3-603; cf. §§ 7-602, 8-317 (which even though more explicit, are to the
same effect). Whether effective garnishment in either case, chattel paper or instruments,
requires a court order is beyond the present point.
30. This is the general rule in transactions other than sale of consumer goods.
31. A HDC's elevated status is preserved by U.C.C. § 9-309.
32. This is true under U.C.C. § 3-305(2), subject to the qualifications of subsections (a)-
(e) thereof and § 3-602.
33. Some courts view U.C.C. § 9-318 as limited to instances of assignments of executory
contracts. See Gramatan Co. v. D'Amico, 50 Misc. 2d 233, 269 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (1966).
34. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1, 433.2 (1977). The original version of the Rule was published on
January 26, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). A revised version was published in 38 Fed. Reg.
892 (1973). The present version appears also in [19761 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIoE (CCH) 10,182-
83. It was promulgated on November 14, 1975 and became effective on May 14, 1976.
35. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1, 433.2(1977) (emphasis added).
36. "Consumer credit contract" is defined as "Any instrument which evidences or embod-
[Vol. 12:53
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broad enough to include consumer paper and the Rule is not limited
to claims and defenses arising from the sale,37 a literal reading of the
provision seems to lead to the conclusion that the Rule encompasses
subjection to collateral defenses. This interpretation, however, ap-
pears to be rebutted by the legislative history of the Rule. It is quite
clear that the Federal Trade Commission addressed itself only to
the application of the HDC doctrine to consumer transactions. 38
Having abolished the doctrine with respect to these transactions the
FTC did not intend to upset the law of instruments any further. 3
Keeping this in mind,40 it will be assumed hereinafter that only
statutes and principles of law governing the rights of a purchaser of
consumer paper are determinative in disposing of the present issue
of subjection to collateral defenses.
C. The Result
Hence, whether a purchaser of consumer paper is held subject to
collateral defenses is a question to be answered by the law of instru-
ments. Underlying the foregoing analysis is the practical considera-
tion that the subjection of purchasers of consumer paper to collat-
eral defenses may be warranted for the same reasons HDC status is
ies a debt arising from ... a 'financed sale' as defined in paragraph ... (e)." Id. §433.1(i).
37. See note 47 infra.
38. Other matters covered by the Rule are waiver of defenses clauses inserted into con-
sumer contracts and connected, or related, loans in consumer transactions. These matters are
beyond the coverage of the present discussion.
39. In this context, consider chapters 11, 111 and VII of the Statement of Basis and Purpose
of the Rule, given by the FTC in 40 Fed. Reg. 53506 et seq. (1975). Consider also the FTC
Release of October 3, 1969, which appears in [1976] 5 CoNs. CREm. GUnDE (CCH) 10,182-
83. Most writers who analyzed the Rule ignored its effect on the question of subjection to
collateral defenses. See, e.g., Gains, Consumer Protection: FTC Rule-Preservation of Buyer's
Claims and Defenses in Consumer Installment Sales, 21 J. Pus. L. 169 (1972); Merrit, New
FR: Preservation of Claims and Defenses in Consumer Credit Transactions-Uniform Protec-
tion Comes to the Scene, 9 U.C.C.L.J. 65 (1976). But see McNeill, The Necessity of Retaining
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 149, 159-60 (1973) (suggesting that the Rule,
taken at face value, appears to subject the holder to collateral defenses).
40. It should also be kept in mind that there are some doubts with respect to the scope of
the Rule. These doubts are attributed to the limitations placed on both the Commission's
intrastate jurisdiction and its authority to regulate banks, as well as to the questionable
enforcement power of the Commission. Individual consumers lack the power to enforce viola-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See generally Rohner, supra note 6, at 524-26.
But cf. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (private
relief against a violater [in this case the seller, not the financer] of the FTC Act).
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denied to these purchasers.41 Obviously, where a holder of consumer
paper is entitled to HDC status the present issue of collateral defen-
ses does not arise.
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SUBJECTING PURCHASERS OF
CONSUMER PAPER To DEFENSES ARISING OUT OF ANOTHER
TRANSACTION
A. An Overview
A consumer may face a demand for goods delivered to him under
one sales transaction while he has defenses42 against the same seller
arising out of a different transaction.4 3 The issue here is to what
extent, if any, these collateral defenses44 are available to the con-
sumer in a suit instituted by the financer upon an instrument given
by the consumer in return for goods with which he is completely
satisfied.
The case of a consumer having more than one sales agreement
with the same seller is quite realistic. In fact, this situation was
expressly referred to by the National Commission of Consumer Fi-
nance in another context.45 Surprisingly, there are no cases which
41. See notes 7-11 supra, and accompanying text.
42. The word "defenses" is used here in its broadest sense so as to include rights of
recoupment, set-off and counterclaim. See 4 CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 896 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
43. A "contract" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(11) as "the total legal obligation which
results from the parties' agreement .... " (i.e. from their bargain in fact; see U.C.C. § 1-
201(3)). Claims and defenses of the consumer which arise from binding collateral promises
given by the seller in connection with the financed contract of sale, rather than from separate
and different transactions, are considered as part of its terms. See U.C.C. § 3-119(1), Com-
ments 1 and 3 (collateral promises contained in a separate written agreement executed as part
of the sales transaction are to be used together with the underlying contract); U.C.C. § 2-
202(b) (admissibility of evidence designed to establish "consistent additional terms" to
agreed terms contained in a writing). It follows that the Code rejects the holding of the
English case of [1911] 1 K.B. 181, under which an assignee of a contract for sale was found
to take his right free from a claim of the buyer, based on misrepresentation of the seller with
respect to the actual value of the goods, even though the buyer's claim was submitted to the
court merely by way of defense to the assignee's claim in an attempt to reduce the price of
the goods. See also U.C.C. § 2-312 through 2-315 (warranties); U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2.
44. Expressions such as "collateral defenses," "defenses arising from another transac-
tion," "mere personal defenses" and "equities of the parties" are used interchangeably.
45. Multiple purchases from a single seller are also involved in the problem of cross-
collateral given by a consumer in "add-on" sales. See NATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONSUMER
FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (December 1972) [hereinafter cited as
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deal with the issue presented above, nor has it been discussed by
commentators."6 Most consumer credit legislation has ignored it as
well.17 The present discussion, therefore, will focus on the law deal-
ing with commercial paper in general and on the principles which
govern its application to the consumer credit market. The effect of
statutory regulation of consumer paper will also be considered.
B. Interpreting the U. C. C. as Subjecting Purchasers of Consumer
Paper to Collateral Defenses
Prior to the passage of the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882,18
English courts rejected the idea of subjecting a holder of a bill" to
N.C.C.F. Report]; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965)(thirteen purchases from the same seller over a five year period).
The technique of taking cross-collateral in "add-on" sales stresses the connection between
the contracts rather than their independence. A financer who attempts to benefit from this
technique presumably will be barred from evading subjection to the terms of another contract
covered by the cross-collateral. See Section 1 (E) infra.
46. The issue was mentioned without discussion in Feltham, supra note 8, at 462-63. See
also McNeill, supra note 39, at 159-60.
47. Thus the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (U3C) (1974) deals only with "claims and
defenses of the consumer against the seller . . . arising from the sale . . ." or with claims
and defenses of a card-holder against the seller . ., arising from the sale .... " U3C §§
3.404, 3.405 and 3.403 (emphasis added). The U3C prohibits the use of negotiable instruments
in consumer installment sales. This is irrelevant, however, in determining that the U3C
ignores the issue of collateral defenses. See note 127 infra. See also National Consumer Law
Center, Model Consumer Credit Act, §§ 2.601, 2.602, 2.603 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Model
Act]; N.C.C.F. Report, supra note 45, at 35-36. But see FTC Trade Regulation Rule, May
14, 1976, which states that "any holder . . . is subject to all claims and defenses which the
debtor could assert against the seller .... "[1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUmE (CCH) 10,183
(emphasis added). Unlike the other statutes just referred to, this Rule is not limited to claims
and defenses arising from the sale, hence it may be plausible to argue that it allows collateral
defenses. Moreover, the argument that "defenses" in this Rule should be interpreted accord-
ing to the meaning given the word in the law merchant does not seem to apply here. See note
21 supra, and accompanying text; notes 99 and 137 infra, and accompanying text. But see
note 39 supra, and accompanying text.
Some statutes have expressly dealt with the issue of defenses arising from another transac-
tion. See An Act to Amend the Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REv. STAT., c.2 (1st Supp. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as the Canadian statute] which provides that "the right of a holder of a
. , consumer note . . . is subject to any defense or right of set-off, other than counter-
claim. ... ." Canadian statute § 191 (emphasis added). See notes 127-32 infra, and accom-
panying text.
48. 45 & 46 Vict., c.61 (Eng).
49. The fact that the cases referred to in previous notes dealt with a holder of an overdue
instrument rather than with a holder of a due instrument who is disqualified from being a
HDC is irrelevant. The law which covers both situations is identical. The special problem of
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defenses not arising from the specific underlying transaction. "The
indorsee of [a] . . .bill takes it subject to all the equities that
attach to the bill itself . . . but . . .does not take it subject to
claims arising out of collateral matters . . . "I' or "equities of the
parties."5' This rule survived the Bills of Exchange Act. It is ac-
cepted by all leading commentators who have examined the English
Act, and similar enactments in other jurisdictions52 modeled on the
Act, that a holder of a bill, though not in due course, takes it free
from "mere personal defenses" which are beyond the scope of the
transaction underlying the bill.5
The language of American legislation was troublesome because of
the ambiguity in the scope and meaning of the term "defenses." The
Negotiable Instruments Law54 (NIL) § 58 states that: "In the hands
of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instru-
ment is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-
negotiable. . . -51 It was argued under NIL § 58 that whenever a
state statute made a collateral defense available to an assignee of a
non-negotiable instrument, which for that purpose was identical
with any ordinary chose in action,56 the defense applied also to a
negotiable instrument. This argument was rejected in Lincoln v.
Grant57 which construed the word "defenses" in § 58 as not applica-
ble to collateral transactions.58 The argument was accepted, how-
the bona-fide holder of an overdue bill, discussed in Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31
HARv. L. REv. 1104 (1918), has no bearing upon our case.
50. Oulds v. Harrison, 156 Eng. Rep. 566, 569 (1854) (emphasis added).
51. In re Overend, Gurney & Co., L.R. 6 eq. 344, 359 (1868) (emphasis added).
52. For a complete list of these jurisdictions see FALCONBRIDGE, ON BANKING AND BILLS OF
EXCHANGE 431-32 (7th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Falconbridge].
53. See CHALMERS, ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 123 (13th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Chal-
mers]; Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 667; COWEN, ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
IN SOUTH AFRICA 274 (4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Cowen]; BYLEs, ON BILLS OF
EXCHANGE 194-95 (23rd ed. 1975) (also referring to Canada and South Africa).
54. The Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) promulgated in 1896 was the first major
project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Up to 1924
when it was last enacted it was adopted by 48 states. See Braucher, The Legislative History
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. Rv. 798, 799 (1958).
55. NIL § 58 (emphasis added).
56. But cf. U.C.C. § 9-308(3), Comment 3 ("non-negotiable instrument" in the section is
not "as broad as the common law concept of 'chose in action' ").
57. 47 D.C. App. 475 (1918).
58. The exhaustive discussion in the Lincoln case with regard to collateral defenses was
dictum as the court found that the defendant might have used fraud, a clear defect of title,
as a defense.
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ever, in Litcher v. North City Trust Co.59 where the court said:
We see no reason for withholding from the words of this section
[NIL § 58] their plain and unambiguous meaning. We think that it
means just what it says: that, irrespective of what the law may have
been prior to the passage of that act [NIL], thereafter the same
defenses as if the instrument were nonnegotiable could be made
against negotiable paper, if it was in the hands of any holder other
than a holder in due course. .... 11
These two conflicting authorities were examined in Stegal v.
Union Bank & Federal Trust Co." where it was concluded that the
opinion in the Litcher case "does not bear internal evidence of very
careful consideration of the subject, and is less convincing in its
reasoning than is Lincoln v. Grant."82 The court admitted that:
At first blush it may appear that [NIL § 58] in effect makes the
provisions [which govern non-negotiable instruments] applicable to
a negotiable instrument . . . [However,] . . . that view has been
seriously controverted on the ground that "defenses" was used in
section 58, N.I.L. in the same sense that it was used in the Law
Merchant [i.e., technical defenses as distinguished from set-
offs]. . . . A careful examination of the subject leads us to the con-
clusion that this is the correct interpretation of the word "defenses." 3
The moving force behind the court's conclusion was undoubtedly
the origin, history and purpose of the NIL, which was mainly "to
codify and make certain and uniform the rules of the law-
merchant.""4 Britton considers the Stegal decision as "the better
view."65
59. 111 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 169 A. 409 (1933).
60. Id. 169 A. at 410 (emphasis added).
61. 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (1934).
62. Id. at 455, 176 S.E. at 454.
63. Id. at 452-53, 176 S.E. at 453. (emphasis added). Accord, First & Citizens Nat'l Bank
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 210 Va. 434, 440-41, 171 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1970); Goldberg v.
Rothman, 66 Misc. 2d 981, 322 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1971).
64. Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 459, 176 S.E. 438, 456.
65. BUrrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF Bias AND NoTEs, 450 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as BRrrroN]. See also 20 Am. Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment and Set-off §§ 131-
38.
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Thus it would appear that on the eve of the adoption of the U.C.C.
the majority rule in this country was that unless a state had a
statute expressly making specific collateral defenses available
against a holder of a negotiable instrument,66 none of these defenses
were available against him."
Does this rule remain in force under the U.C.C.? It is provided in
the Code that "[u]nless he has the rights of a holder in due course
any person takes the instrument subject to all defenses of any party
which would be available in an action on a simple contract. "68 It is
stated in the Comments that "paragraph (b) restates the first sent-
ence of the original Section 58."69 But note that, unlike NIL § 58,
U.C.C. § 3-306(b) speaks of "defenses of any party" rather than of
defenses to the instrument, thereby implying the subjection of the
holder also to the "equities of the parties," i.e, to collateral defen-
ses. 0 Even assuming that the language of U.C.C. § 3-306(b) is not
different from that of NIL § 58, a closer analysis of the relation
between § 3-306(b) and § 9-318 makes the question of collateral
defenses under the Code considerably more complex."
66. Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 447, 176 S.E. 438, 450 (1934)
(concise history of enactment of such statutes).
67. See Curlee v. Ruland, 56 Okla. 329, 155 P. 1182 (1916). It should also be kept in mind
that original parties to a transaction may include within its framework terms relating to
collateral defenses so as to make them part of the agreement binding the holder. See National
Surety Corp. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 30, 150 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1966). In both
situations, the holder is subject to the collateral defenses included within either the statute
or the agreement. Our concern, however, is with the meaning of "defenses" in the section
dealing with rights of a holder not in due course in the enactment applicable to commercial
paper.
68. U.C.C. § 3-306(b) (emphasis added). Cf. § 3-306(c) (subjection to particular defenses,
including failure of consideration which is a defense to a simple contract and therefore also
covered by U.C.C. § 3-306(b)).
69. U.C.C. § 3-306, Comment 3. Two recent cases applied the Stegal interpretation upon
U.C.C. § 3-306(b) somewhat mechanically without questioning whether the rule had changed.
See Goldberg v. Rothman, 66 Misc. 2d 981, 322 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1971); United Overseas
Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596, 606-07 (D.C. Md. 1974). The latter case gave
considerable weight to U.C.C. § 3-306, Comment 3.
70. See note 51 supra, and accompanying text; cf. notes 92-97 infra, and accompanying
text.
71. This is true, at least in situations where the instrument evidences a contract assign-
ment of which would have been governed by Article 9 of the Code. Note that under U.C.C. §
9-102(1)(b), Article 9 applies not only to creating security interests in accounts, contract
rights on chattel paper, but also to their outright sales. Neither § 9-104(0 or any other section
makes any exception applicable to our case as described in notes 3 and 16 supra, and accom-
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Before looking at § 9-318, it is necessary to analyze the reasoning
which led to the rule making collateral defenses unavailable against
a holder unless there was a specific statute to the contrary. At com-
mon law, in contrast to the civil law "compensation" which operates
automatically by the sole operation of law to extinguish mutual
obligations,72 collateral defenses7 3 were regarded as personal privi-
leges and not incidents or accompaniments of the debt.74 The obligor
was free to raise these defenses at his option. Alternatively, however,
he could maintain an independent action even after judgment
against him on the principal debt.75 Collateral defenses were inci-
dents of the enforcement of the principal obligation rather than its
modification,76 and they operated merely as a convenient mode of
settling mutual accounts or preventing multiplicity of actions .77 The
subjection of an assignee to collateral defenses did not rest upon the
concept of assignment; neither was it rooted in statutes regulating
rights and liabilities of an assignee of a simple contract.7 Rather, it
panying text. The situation under other statutes dealing with assignment of contracts is
mentioned in note 82 infra.
72. Nicholls, The Legal Nature of Bank Deposits in the Province of Quebec, 13 CAN. B.
Rxv. 635, 647 (1935).
73. Most authorities dealt only with one type of collateral defense, the right of set-off. See
cases and authorities cited in notes 53, 59 and 61 supra. Set-off is a right to a liquidated sum
of money determined by a mere process of subtraction. See Falconbridge, supra note 52, at
163; CoRBIN, supra note 42, at §§ 896-97. See generally Loyd, The Development of Set-Off,
64 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Loyd]. For a discussion of the similarities
and distinctions between compensation and set-off see Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 437,
852.
The reasoning given by these authorities may be applied to all collateral defenses. It may
be noted that in at least one legal system, South Africa, set-off is evidently considered as a
defect in title rather than a collateral defense. Walker v. Syfret, A.D. 141, 162 (1911). See
Cowen, supra note 53, at 274. This does not mean, however, that the rules developed with
regard to set-off in other common law jurisdictions do not apply to collateral defenses which
are recognized as such in South Africa. What constitutes a collateral defense is determined
by each state's law.
74. Lincoln v. Grant, 47 D.C. App. 475, 783 (1918).
75. Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 445-46, 176 S.E. 438, 450 (1934),
citing BIGLOW, ON BiLus, NoTEs AND CHECKS § 551 (3d ed).
76. Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 852.
77. Id. at 671.
78. Neither the English statute nor the one in force in the Province of Ontario, Canada,
cited in Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 159, refers to collateral defenses, but is rather confined
to "equities..... "An equity of this class must be inseparably connected with, or inherent
in, the assigned debt, or be part of the transaction out of which the debt arose ... " Id. at
162. But cf. note 83 infra, and accompanying text. The relevant English statute is the Law
of Property Act 1925, s. 136.
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depended upon the existence of a specific and separate statute deal-
ing with the effect of collateral defenses.79 Hence collateral defenses
were not considered defenses to which an instrument was subject
within the contemplation of NIL § 58.
It appears that this legal framework was not adopted by the Code.
In dealing with the effect of assignment of simple contracts, U.C.C.
§ 9-318(1)(b) subjects the rights of an assignee to "any other defense
or claim of the account debtor"0 against the assignor which accrues
before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment." 8'
The obligor still must indicate some rule of law making the collat-
eral defenses available to him against the claim of the assignor.82
Once he has done so he may assert these defenses against the
assignee by the mere operation of § 9-318(1). Another kind of possi-
ble defense is provided by § 9-318(1) (a) which subjects the rights of
an assignee to claims and defenses which may arise from the terms
of the contract. The fact that only § 9-318(1)(b) requires the obligor
to show some rule of law making the defenses available against the
assignor does not affect the equality in treatment of both kinds of
79. Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 671, 163. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 168, comment c (Text. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT], which refers to collateral defenses only within the context of "statutes or rules
of courts."
80. An account debtor is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(a) as "the person who is obligated
on an account, chattel paper, contract right or general intangible." The omission of the term
"contract right" in the 1972 Official Text is irrelevant. A person who is obligated on a
negotiable instrument is not an account debtor.
81. This time limit is viewed as the general rule, at least with respect to the right of set-
off. See Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 163. This limitation is practically immaterial in non-
notification or "indirect collection" arrangements. These arrangements prevail, for example,
in the furniture field where payments from consumers are made to the dealer-assignor who
receives them under a duty to remit to his financers. See U.C.C. § 9-308, Comment 1. See
generally Rothstein, Practice: Maturity of Counterclaims Against Assignees, 19 CORNELL L.
REV. 130 (1934) (discussing accrual of rights against an assignee).
82. U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b) states that the rights of an assignee are subject to "any other
defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor.'" Id. (emphasis added). This
section should be construed, however, as subjecting the assignee's rights to any other defense
or claim of the account debtor against the assignor's claim upon the contract, rather than
merely "against the assignor." It is unlikely that the draftsmen of the Code meant to enable
the account debtor to assert claims against the assignee which are not available to him in an
action upon the contract instituted by the assignor. Most typical would be a personal injury
claim of the account debtor against the assignor. As long as the assignor's claim under the
contract is not subject to this kind of unliquidated collateral claim it does not make any sense
to read § 9-318(1)(b) as subjecting the assignee's right to it.
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defenses under § 9-318(1); the subjection of the right of the original
creditor to the terms of the contract, obvious as it may be to the
modern jurist, is also based upon some rule of law5 3 embodied im-
plicitly in § 9-318(1)(a).
While not governing directly the rights of a person who is obli-
gated on a negotiable instrument, § 9-318(1) stands for the proposi-
tion that collateral defenses affect the right to a sum of money
payable under a contract in the same manner as defenses arising
from the underlying transaction. Consequently, collateral defenses
become "incidents or accompaniments" of the principal debt to the
same extent as defenses arising from the underlying contract. This
result stands clearly in contrast to the assumptions underlying both
the Lincoln and the Stegal decisions and the common law under
which rights under a contract are subject only to defenses arising
therefrom.
Inasmuch as before the enactment of the Code many American
jurisdictions already had statutes providing that an assignment of
contractual rights is without prejudice to any set-off or defense ex-
isting before notice of the assignment,84 § 9-318(1)(b) made no
change in prior law.85 By establishing that an assignee takes the
right of the assignor subject to collateral defenses thereto, those
state statutes preceded the Code in reversing the contrary common
law rule." However, despite the contemporaneous existence of such
83. Thus under the old common law up to the beginning of the 19th century a breach of
contract by the creditor could not be asserted by the obligor as a defense to the claim of the
creditor upon the contract. The obligor had to pay even though he had a valid claim for
damages against his creditor that could be submitted to a court in separate proceedings. This
result stemmed from the theory of independent covenants. See Loyd, supra note 73, at 545-
46. The subjection of the creditor's right to his performance is explained only by the concept
of the bilateral mutual executory contract which is a "rule of law," equal to any other "rule
of law" which makes the creditor's right subject to collateral defenses. Until the beginning
of the 19th century, breach of warranty could not be raised as a defense of the buyer against
the seller's claim. See Kaps v. McGregor, 13 D.L.R.3d 732, 734-35 (1971) (containing a
concise history of the rights of set-off and counterclaim with regard to matters arising from
,he same transaction). The modem rule is stated in U.C.C. § 2-717.
84. See, e.g., Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (1934).
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, at 321 et seq.
85. See U.C.C. § 9-318, Comment 1.
86. But cf. STATE OF NEw JERSEY STUDY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SECOND
I .EPORT To THE GOVERNOR, THE SENATE AND THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
(Clovember 1975) (subjection of an assignee to defenses under U.C.C. § 9-318 (1)(b) is referred
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statutes and the NIL, collateral defenses could be excluded from
"defenses" in NIL § 58, since another section thereof stated that
"[iln any case not provided for in this act [i.e., the NIL] the rules
of the law merchant shall govern."87 The meaning of "defenses" in
NIL § 58, as a "case not provided for" in the NIL, was thus governed
by a rule of the law merchant. Being compatible with the general
principle of the common law-under which collateral defenses do not
affect the right under the principal contract, the definition of
"defenses" derived from the law merchant could determine the
scope of "the same defenses as if [the instrument] were non-
negotiable."88 The state statutes which subjected an assignee of a
contractual right to collateral defenses could be held inapplicable
since the NIL was an independent enactment, with no provision
that principles of law derived from other statutes were to supple-
ment it.
In contrast, when we construe the language of U.C.C. § 3-306(b),
subjecting one not a HDC to "all defenses of any party which would
be available in an action on a simple contract," we find that the
Code provides that "the principles of law . . . including the law
merchant . . ." shall supplement the provisions of the Code
"[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act li.e.,
the U.C.C.]."8 Hence, the provisions of Article 3 of the Code should
not be supplemented by "principles of law" displaced by "the par-
ticular provisions" of Article 9 thereof; rather they should be supple-
mented by the rules established by the displacing provisions. 0 As
applied to our case, "the particular provisions" of U.C.C. § 9-318(1),
making a right under a simple contract subject to collateral defen-
ses, have displaced the inconsistent principle of the common law
to as "the common law rule"). Presumably, the New Jersey commentators referred to "the
common law" in its broadest sense, including statutes enacted in common law jurisdictions.
87. NIL § 196 (emphasis added).
88. NIL § 58.
89. U.C.C. § 1-103.
90. See generally Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961)
(advocating as a rule of construction the view that the Code is plenary and exclusive except
where the legislature has clearly indicated otherwise); Starkey Constr., Inc. v. Elcon Inc., 248
Ark. 958, 457 S.W.2d 509, 519 (1970); Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.,
307 F. Supp. 648, 652 (D.C. Mass. 1969) ("this act" in U.C.C. § 1-103 construed to mean the
entire Code). It should also be recalled that U.C.C. § 3-103(2) expressly makes the provisions
of Article 3 subject to those of Article 9.
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and thus preempted the inconsistent principle of the law merchant
in supplementing the provisions of Article 3 of the Code.91 Thus,
although § 9-318(1) is not directly applicable to suits on an instru-
ment, its delineation of defenses that may be raised in a suit by an
assignee of a contract would seem to be incorporated by reference
under § 3-306.
A position disregarding the distinction between defenses arising
from the contract and collateral defenses can be supported by a
close reading of Article 3 itself. It is well settled law, explicitly
provided for in NIL § 57, that a HDC takes the instrument free from
most claims and defenses, whether they are collateral or resulting
from the contract. 2 It is not surprising therefore to find it assumed
in Article 9 of the Code that a holder in due course takes the instru-
ment free from collateral defenses. 3 However, U.C.C. § 3-305, titled
91. It seems unlikely, however, that courts will reject the application of the law merchant
in construing "defenses" in U.C.C. § 3-306(b) only when they deal with consumer paper. That
is true even though a consumer purchase might be regarded as a non-commercial transaction
beyond the scope of commercial law. See note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
The counterargument, which is likely to prevail, is that as long as both kinds of transactions
are governed by the same statute, it is unsound to construe one word to mean two different
things according to the kind of transaction involved. Cf. note 117 infra, and accompanying
text (Code treats all commercial paper the same). For a discussion of the meaning of
"defenses" in consumer credit legislation see note 47 supra; note 137 infra, and accompanying
text.
92. See Chalmers, supra note 53, at 127 (England); BRrrroN, supra note 65, at 334 (U.S.A.
under the NIL); Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 661 (Canada). "A holder in due course holds
the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves...." NIL § 57 (emphasis added).
93. U.C.C. § 9-318(1) recognizes the validity of "an enforceable agreement not to assert
defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in U.C.C. § 9-206" (emphasis added). An
assignee who can enforce this kind of agreement is also free from collateral defenses. U.C.C.
§ 9.318(1)(b). In this way U.C.C. § 9-318(1) establishes that freedom from collateral defenses
is a mere incident of the freedom from defenses arising out of the sale. This freedom is enjoyed
by an assignee who can enforce the agreement under U.C.C. § 9-206(1). A HDC of an instru-
ment issued "as part of one transaction" with a security agreement is included in this cate-
gory. U.C.C. § 9-206(1). This approach in U.C.C. § 9-318(1) with regard to collateral defenses
also applies to a HDC of a negotiable instrument which was not signed simultaneously with
a security agreement, since under U.C.C. § 9-206(1) the status of the privileged assignee
cannot be more elevated than the status enjoyed by a HDC of a negotiable instrument.
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"Rights of a Holder in Due Course," provides in its relevant part
only that "he takes the instrument free from . . .(2) all defenses
of any party to the instrument. . .".. There is no reference in this
section to freedom from "mere personal defenses"'" or "defenses
available to prior parties among themselves."" Hence these defen-
ses are included in "all defenses of any party to the instrument."
To exclude collateral defenses from "all defenses of any party which
would be available in an action on a simple contract" under § 3-
306(b), while including these defenses in § 3-305(2) would result in
construing "all defenses of any party" differently in each section."
Such an inconsistent interpretation seems unsound in terms of sta-
tutory construction.9 7
If "defenses" in U.C.C. § 3-306(b) includes collateral defenses as
proposed in the preceding discussion, no particular difficulty arises
in the case of the consumer-obligor. It may be argued against this
suggested interpretation of § 3-306, however, that although the gen-
eral rule was always that the mere existence of a simple statute of
94. The English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c.61 §38(2)(Eng.).
95. NIL § 57, supra note 92.
96. Under the NIL the problem did not exist. While NIL § 58 referred to defenses of a
negotiable instrument, NIL § 57 dealt with the freedom of a HDC from defects of title and
"defenses available to prior parties among themselves." NIL § 57 (emphasis added). The
specific context of the word "defenses" in NIL § 57 and its relation to the parties rather than
to the instrument, as it was in NIL § 58, enabled the court in Stegal to construe it for the
purpose of NIL § 58 in a way which did not have to affect its interpretation under NIL § 57.
See note 64 supra, and accompanying text. This is not the case under the U.C.C., where both
§§ 3-305(2) and 3-316(b) refer to "defenses of any party." But see note 97 infra.
97. The only possible way to have preserved the Stegal interpretation under the U.C.C.
would have been to indicate the somewhat literal distinction between "all defenses of any
party to the instrument," U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (emphasis added), and "[aill defenses of any
party which would be available in an action on a simple contract." U.C.C. § 3-306(b) (empha-
sis added). The fallacy of this argument seems to be that the expression used in U.C.C. § 3-
305 should not be interpreted to refer to defenses which are outside those available in a suit
upon the contract, i.e. instrument. See note 82 supra. In addition, the general policy of Article
9 seems to bar any strict interpretation of the expression used in U.C.C. § 3-306. However,
to a too eager court, this somewhat different language seems to be the only way to free the
holder of a negotiable instrument from collateral defenses under Article 3.
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set-off, i.e., a statute which makes the right of set-off available to
an obligor as a defense against his creditor, is sufficient to impliedly
subject the assignee of a simple contract thereto,"5 this was never the
rule under the old law merchant with regard to negotiable instru-
ments.2 9
By itself this counterargument does not present any difficulty
with regard to the proposition that under the U.C.C. a holder is
subject to collateral defenses; it is simply assumed that with respect
to this point the Code rejects the ancient rule of the law merchant."'0
However, one might suggest that as neither the common law which
governs the rights of an assignee '01 nor the explicit provisions of a
simple statute of set-off0  is the authority for subjecting the assignee
of a simple contract to collateral defenses, this authority should be
found within some "external force" which gives courts the compe-
tence to subject only an assignee of a simple contract, but not a
holder of a negotiable instrument, to these defenses.
The -validity of this suggestion seems doubtful. Once a claim is
regarded as subject to certain defenses, whether arising from the
contract underlying it or one collateral to it, the identity of its
holder, whether the assignor or assignee,103 should not make any
98. See Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 440, 176 S.E. 438, 448 (1934).
A simple statute of set-off is "a statute which simply provides that, in an action brought
against a defendant on his promise to pay, the defendant may have set-off against the
demand of the plaintiff any cross-demands in the nature of a debt due which he has against
the plaintiff." Id. at 440, 176 S.E. at 448.
The rule cited in the text above is also in force in the Province of Ontario, Canada, under
the Judicature Act § 131 which provides that "where there are mutual debts between the
plaintiff and the defendant. ., one debt may be set against the other" (emphasis added).
This is a simple statute of set-off, nevertheless it was held to apply to debts due the defendant
from the assignor of the plaintiff. See HOLmESTEAD AND GALE, 1 THE JUDIcATURE AcT OF
OTARAIO AND RuLEs OF PRACTICE (ANNOTATED) § 17 (1974).
A simple statute of set-off should be distinguished from statutes allowing prior party set-
offs under which an assignee is explicitly held subject to set-offs. See Stegal v. Union Bank
& Fed, Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 440-42, 176 S.E. 438, 447-48 (1934). See also note 84 supra,
and accompanying text.
99. Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 443, 176 S.E. 438, 449 (1934).
100. See notes 80-97 supra, and accompanying text.
101. See note 78 supra, and accompanying text.
102. See note 98 supra, and accompanying text.
103. The special rule concerning the freedom of a HDC, or an assignee under U.C.C. § 9-
206(1), from most defenses, being focused on the conditions of the acquisition of the claim
rather than its inherent limitations, is irrelevant in this context.
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difference.' 4 Similarly, the form of the claim, whether arising from
a simple contract or embodied in a negotiable instrument, should
not constitute a valid ground for distinction as long as one accepts
the principle that a holder takes the instrument subject to defenses"which would be available in an action on a simple contract." ' If
the application of the rule of the law merchant is rejected as sug-
gested above no other "external force" is available, and "defenses"
in § 3-306 should then be construed according to the provisions of §
9-318(1).
C. Availability of Collateral Defenses under "Legal" and
"Equitable" Title Theories
The view that there is nothing in the common law to suggest a
distinction between the effect of collateral defenses on the rights of
an assignee of a simple contract and on those of a holder of a negoti-
able instrument, that such a distinction is derived only from the law
merchant and that its applicability should be examined in light of
relevant statutory provisions was not shared by at least two distin-
guished scholars. While not addressing themselves to the then non-
existent U.C.C., Cook and Williston proposed conflicting theories,
irrespective of the rule of the law merchant, explaining: (1) the
subjection of an assignee of a simple contract to collateral defenses;
and (2) the freedom of a holder of a negotiable instrument from
collateral defenses. While the adoption of either of these theories
prima facie entails the exclusion of collateral defenses from the
"defenses" in § 3-306, one may still argue on the basis of either
theory that a purchaser of consumer paper, at least the one closely
related to the seller, is subject to the collateral defenses of the con-
sumer.
(a) Cook, whose proposition is that the title of the assignee of a
chose in action is legal, i.e., recognized by the common law as well
104. In a hypothetical legal system which recognizes the subjection of a creditor to defen-
ses arising from the contract and gives effect to assignment of choses in action, but fails to
provide a section such as U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(a), the assignee will not take the creditor's claim
free from the defenses which are available against it. See note 83 supra. If this analysis is
correct, there seems to be no specific "external force" which subjects the assignee to a right
to set-off under a simple statute of set-offs.
105. U.C.C. § 3-306(b).
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as in equity,"0 6 argues that the justification for permitting the credi-
tors of the assignor to assert their set-offs against the assignee "is
to be found ultimately in principles of fairness, of public policy,
etc." I' In no place does he attempt to apply this proposition to
negotiable instruments. However, once the power of courts to de-
velop rules of law based on these considerations is recognized, there
seems to be no apparent reason to bar them from doing so even with
respect to negotiable instruments. This power seems to be justifia-
bly used with regard to consumer paper which is issued in what may
be considered as a non-commercial set of facts,'"" especially when it
is negotiated to someone closely related to the payee."0
(b) Williston, whose basic thesis is that the assignee of a chose
in action should be regarded as holding an equitable title to it,110
considers the equitable nature of the assignee's title as the only
concept which can explain the subjection of the assignee to the right
of set-off, based upon a debt due from the original creditor.' It is
clear, however, that Williston does not suggest applying this conten-
tion to negotiable instruments whose legal title is vested in the
holder." 2 Mr. Williston even goes so far as to exclude from his theory
choses in action having a tangible form, assigned by delivery though
not negotiable." 3 Nevertheless, his view of the equitable right may
be illuminating for our purposes. He defines it as "a right against a
particular person, and exists against others only when their relation
to that person is such that in conscience they should be subject to
his duties."" 4 Since the subjection of a financer to consumer defen-
106. See Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARv. L. REV. 816, 820-21 (1916).
107. See Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston, 30
HARv. L. Rav. 449, 475 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Cook].
108. See note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
109. See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
110. See 3 WILLISTON, WILISTON ON CONrRAcTs § 447 (3d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
CONTRACTS]; Williston, Is The Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?,
30 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Williston).
111. CoNT'rcrs, supra note 110, § 447; Williston, supra note 110, at 101-02.
112. See Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARv. L. REV. 1104, 1112 (1918).
113. See CoNTACrs, supra note 110, § 447; Williston, supra note 110, at 107; note 138
infra.
114. CONTRACTS, supra note 110, § 446A. See also Williston, supra note 110, at 97; Willis-
ton, The Word "Equitable" and its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action, 31
HARV. L. Rv. 822, 829 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Word Equitable] (answer to Cook, supra,
note 107).
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ses is justified, inter alia, by his special connection with the seller,"15
the equitable title theory might be regarded as providing the ground
for this subjection. According to Williston's view, as presented
above, the application of this theory entails subjection to collateral
defenses. "
Each theory, either Cook's or Williston's, while not addressing
itself to the Code, seems to provide us with an alternative technique
under which courts may establish in the case of the consumer an
exception to the freedom of holders from collateral defenses. The
remaining crucial issue under both theories is whether courts are
free to shape different rules of law for one class of negotiable instru-
ments when the Code treats all kinds of commercial paper uni-
formly."7
Under the "legal title" theory such judicial freedom seems very
doubtful since that theory is more inclined to arguments based upon
formalism and the objectivity of the definition."8 The "equitable
title" theory must first overcome the general acceptance of the idea
that a holder of a negotiable instrument has a legal title to it, which
implies recognition of the preference to be given to formality and
objectivity of the definition in this field of law."' Second, it must
overcome the fact that in the only context 20 where the issue of
equitable title to a possessor of a negotiable instrument was ever
115. See notes 8 and 109 supra, and accompanying text.
116. This way the equitable title theory, being focused on the relation between the trans-
feror and the transferee, is necessarily confined to explaining the subjection of the closely
related financer to collateral defenses. On the other hand, the legal title theory which finds
the collateral defenses in principles of fairness, of public policy, etc., see note 107 supra, may
have a broader implication so as to establish a rule of law which also subjects the unrelated
financer to collateral defenses.
117. Cf. note 91 supra (particular provisions of Code preempt inconsistencies).
118. Thus even though Cook recognizes the validity of fairness and public policy he
supplies an additional ground for subjecting the assignee of a chose in action to set-offs, that
is the "partial. ownership" in the chose up to the notification. See Cook, supra note 107, at
474. This argument was criticized by Williston. See Word Equitable, supra note 114, at 830.
119. Cook, supra note 107, at 475-76. But cf. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283,
224 So.2d 638 (1969) (invoking equity jurisdiction for protecting a consumer against a claim
of a HDC). For a comment on the case see Williamson, 1 WM. SAM. L. REv. 291 (1970).
120. The context referred to involves the transferee for value of an unindorsed instrument.
In England it was held under the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c.61, § 31(4),
that such a transferee, a possessor of the instrument, obtains merely an equitable title. See
Chalmers, supra note 53, at 111.
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dealt with, even though rejected in this country, 2' the question of
collateral defenses was completely ignored."' The general policy of
the U.C.C. in reversing the English 2 3 and the old NIL 4 rule by
establishing the possibility that even an agent for collection, whose
agency is apparent from the note itself, may qualify as a HDC'15
implicitly rejects the creation of specific rules on the basis of any
special relationship.
Thus it may be concluded that unless "defenses" in U.C.C. § 3-
306(b) is interpreted to include "collateral defenses" for all kinds of
transactions, it is very difficult to establish a specific rule applying
only to instruments issued in return for consumer goods. Even the
fact that the financer might have financed both the principal and
collateral transactions does not make any material difference when
his cause of action does not rest upon the collateral sales agreement.
As long as collateral defenses are not regarded as available against
his claim, they are simply beyond the scope of the issue submitted
by the financer for judicial determination and hence cannot be
raised by the consumer.
D. Consumer paper subject to specific consumer credit legislation
Up to this point it has been assumed that the rights of a purchaser
of consumer paper are determined exclusively by U.C.C. § 3-306,
either alone or with supplementary general principles of law. Nu-
merous jurisdictions, however, have dealt with rights of purchasers
121. The idea of the equitable title of this transferee was rejected in the United States
under NIL § 49, where it was held that he acquires a legal title to the instrument. See
BrrON, supra note 65, § 74. Presumably this is the situation under U.C.C. § 3-201.
122. The whole question of equitable title within this context is somewhat confusing, as
the real issue is merely the independence of the transferee's cause of action. Equity, however,
recognized the independent cause of action of the assignee long before the common law and
eventually even common law courts gave effect to it based on either an equitable or legal title.
See authorities cited in notes 106, 107, 110 and 114 supra. In fact, no leading commentator
argues that the equitable title of a transferee, who is a possessor of an unindorsed instrument,
implies his subjection to collateral defenses. Under U.C.C. § 3-306(b), dealing with any
person who takes an instrument, the transferee of an unindorsed instrument is subject to the
same defenses as a holder, hence the nature of his title turns out to be immaterial in determin-
ing the scope of his subjection.
123. Bill of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c.61, §§ 35-36. See also Chalmers, supra
note 53, at 128 (suing as agent or trustee).
124. NIL §§ 36, 47.
125. U.C.C. §§ 3-205, -206.
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of consumer paper legislatively.'2 It will be determined now whether
such legislation in any way affects the conclusions reached so far.'
This determination must in turn depend upon the legislative ap-
proach, adopted in each jurisdiction. There are two major forms of
legislation. The first is statutory regulation of consumer paper as
part of the statute governing negotiable instruments except as
otherwise indicated.' 8 An example of this method of regulation,
taken from a foreign jurisdiction not governed by the Code, is the
Canadian statute'25 which governs bills and notes in general. An
amendment thereto provides that the holder of consumer paper "is
subject to any defense or right of set-off, other than counterclaim,
that the purchaser would have had in an action by the seller on the
consumer bill or consumer note."' 130 Since the Canadian legislature
explicitly provided for the subjection of a purchaser of consumer
paper to the right of set-off,"'3 the consumer is protected against the
126. See generally Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyers' Defenses-State Statutes
Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 132 (1972).
127. Naturally no problem would arise under legislation which provides specific regula-
tion of the collateral defenses issue. See note 47 supra. The problem of the availability of
collateral defenses against purchasers of consumer paper would also not arise in legislation
which prohibited the use of instruments following the definition of negotiable instruments in
U.C.C. § 3-104 (as does U3C § 3.307). See also English Consumer Credit Act of 1974, 22 &
23 Eliz. II, c.39, § 123. However, the silence of the U3C with regard to collateral defenses in
dealing with the rights of an assignee while explicitly subjecting him to defenses arising from
the principal sale (see U3C § 3.404) may lead courts to interpret it as rejecting the subjec-
tion of an assignee to collateral defenses. On the other hand, it may be argued that this is an
unwarranted negative implication and that U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b) should govern the case as a
supplementary provision as contemplated by U3C § 1.103. Due to policy considerations the
second interpretation seems preferable.
128. Hence, for example, apart from the present issue of defenses, a holder of consumer
paper in that system would enjoy the benefit of the presumption prescribed in U.C.C. § 3-
307.
129. See note 47 supra (last paragraph).
130. Id. (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that, since 1884, this is basically the situation
under the Canadian statute with regard to bills or notes given in return for a patent right,
except their holder is also subject to counterclaims. See Canadian statute, supra note 47, §
15. Originally the 1884 amendment was enacted to prevent fraud in these transactions. See
Ziegel, Comment-Range v. Corporation De Finance B&lvMdere-Consumer Notes-Status
of Subsequent Holders -Need for Legislative Intervention, 48 CAN. B. REv. 309, 320 n.54
(1970). Falconbridge proposed a repeal of the sections dealing with bills and notes given for
a patent right. See Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 459. Nevertheless, this model was imitated
by the Canadian legislature in regulating consumer bills and notes. See Ziegel,
Comment-Comsumer Notes-Bill c-208-Bills of Exchange Amendment Act, 49 CAN. B.
REv. 121 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ziegel].
131. See note 73 supra. It is worthwhile to recall that the general rule in Canada concern-
PURCHASE OF CONSUMER PAPER
holder for a complete failure of consideration of a collateral transac-
tion,' 31 or at least its partial failure expressed in an ascertained and
liquidated sum of money.'1
The second form of legislation is the regulatidn of consumer paper
outside the scope of the general statute applicable to commercial
paper. In jurisdictions employing this form of legislation, a further
distinction should be drawn between two kinds of legislative treat-
ment:
(a) When the legislature does not go further than establishing''consumer paper" and subjecting its holder to claims and defenses
permitted under U.C.C. § 3-306, the unavoidable implication is that
except for disqualifying any holder of such an instrument from being
a HDC, the legislature treats the paper as commercial paper under
U.C.C. Article 3. In other words, the issue of subjection to collateral
defenses should be determined in this system as under U.C.C. § 3-
306(b). This is the situation under the Rhode Island statute.134 In
principle, the solution is identical to the one given when the prob-
lem is regulated within the statute which deals with commercial
paper in general.
(b) However, when the legislature goes further and provides ex-
plicitly that consumer paper should not be regarded as commercial
paper within U.C.C. Article 3135 the solution lies beyond the scope
of that Article.
A new problem then arises-what is this "consumer paper"? Be-
cause it is a writing which evidences a monetary obligation, is trans-
ing a holder of bills and notes issued not in return for consumer goods or patent rights is that
he takes the instrument free from collateral defenses. See note 53 supra, and accompanying
text.
132. See Ziegel, supra note 130, at 128.
133. This is, however, also the extent of the protection given to the obligor in Canada with
respect to the underlying transaction itself. See Falconbridge, supra note 52, at 620. Cf.
U.C.C. § 3-408 (last sentence).
134. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-28-6 (1970), § 6-27-5 (Supp. 1976). Similar effect should be
granted to the N.C.C.F. Recommendation with regard to Holder in Due Course Doctrine-
Waiver of Defenses Clauses-Connected Loans, N.C.C.F. Report, supra note 45, at 35-36.
135. This is the situation under ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.541(a) (Supp. 1971); HAwAII REV.
STAT. ANN. § 476-36 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 255 § 12C (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16C-64.2 (1970). See also Legislation Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1961) (1961 Mass.
statute).
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ferable by delivery and is not itself a security agreement or lease,
consumer paper is certainly included within the category of
"instrument" as defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g).135 However, even
though it complies with the formal pattern of a negotiable instru-
ment, the principles of the law merchant should not be applied in
determining rights of parties upon it.' ' Likewise, the person who is
obligated on consumer paper is definitely not an account debtor,38
thus his relations with the transferee are excluded from the coverage
of U.C.C. § 9-318.
The problem which emerges here is determining what principles
of law govern the rights of a transferee of a non-negotiable instru-
ment. In this context it was implicitly suggested by Williston that
a transferee of a chose in action having tangible form, assigned by
delivery though not negotiable, takes it free from collateral defen-
ses.'31 While it is clear that a non-negotiable instrument fits easily
136. "'Instrument' means ... any . . . writing which evidences a right to payment of
money and is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type which is in the ordinary
course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement of assignment."
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(g). Query: Assuming that (a) no holder of consumer paper can qualify as
a HDC, (b) a transferee for value of an unindorsed instrument acquires title thereto (see note
120 supra) and (c) the holder of this paper does not enjoy the presumptions given by U.C.C.
Article 3 in favor of a holder of a negotiable instrument (see note 128 supra) what is the effect
of indorsing consumer paper? What does indorsement add to delivery except its evidential
value? Since U.C.C. §§ 3-414 and 3-417 do not apply, what contract and warranty obligations
are undertaken by the indorsement of consumer paper?
137. See note 47 supra. This is in contrast to the postal money order pronouncement "Not
a Negotiable Instrument" dealt with in United States v. First National Bank, 263 F. Supp.
298, 301 (D. Mass. 1967), where the court applied the law merchant due to the order's
compliance with the general formal pattern of a negotiable instrument. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 3-
104(3), -805 (which do not seem to apply to consumer paper).
138. As a signer of the instrument (see notes 16-34 supra, and accompanying text) he is
not obligated on an account, U.C.C. § 9-106, chattel paper, U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b), contract
right, U.C.C. § 9-106, or general intangible, U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a). The omission of the term
"contract right" from the 1972 Official Text is irrelevant.
139. See note 114 supra and authorities cited concerning Williston's theory with regard
to choses in action having tangible form assigned by delivery though not negotiable. As for
latent equities, his contention is that such choses in action are governed by the same law
which applies to negotiable instruments due to the legal title which is vested in their owner.
Since Williston bases the subjection of an assignee to set-offs upon his mere equitable title
(see notes 110-11 supra, and accompanying text) it follows that insofar as the assignee of a
tangible chose in action has a legal title to it he should not be subject to set-offs. He does
not say so explicitly, but it is implied from his general theory. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that even with regard to latent equities, most cases do not give effect to any special rule
concerning negotiable instruments, a fortiori, no such rule applies to choses in action having
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into this category of choses in action,'40 the question is whether such
doctrine exists at all in present law.
If chattel paper is also included in this category of choses in action
having tangible form, assigned by delivery though not negotiable,
as might be suggested from some of the Comments to the Code,'4'
the implication from Williston's view is rejected by U.C.C. § 9-
318(1)(b), under which an assignee takes chattel paper subject to
collateral defenses. However, the provisions of the Code go contrary
to the opinion reflected in the Comments, and it seems clear that
actual delivery is not a requisite of the ordinary mode of transfer of
rights upon chattel paper; assignment of chattel paper as well as of
the other rights dealt with in § 9-318 is affected by giving notice to
the account debtor, rather than by delivery of the tangible paper
which embodies it."' Being inapplicable to the rights of a transferee
of a non-negotiable instrument' in particular, as well as to the
rights of a transferee of a tangible chose in action' in general, the
wording of § 9-318(1) neither adopts nor rejects the existence of a
specific doctrine which governs the rights of transferees of choses in
action having tangible form, assigned by delivery though not negoti-
able.
On the other hand, the freedom of a transferee of a non-negotiable
instrument or any other tangible chose in action from collateral
defenses can be based only on the distinction between defenses
against the debt and defenses against the creditor personally,'45 a
distinction which is inconsistent with the rule of law that emerges
tangible form though not negotiable. See BRrrroN, supra note 65, at 458-61. Williston's view
with respect to latent equities and negotiable instruments has found support. See Chafee,
supra note 112, at 1119-20.
140. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g).
141. See U.C.C. § 9-105, Comment 3 (delivery of instruments as well as chattel paper "is
only the minimum stated"). See also U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 2 (claim evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper is merged or merely symbolized by the piece of paper). But cf.
U.C.C. § 9-103 (Official Text 1972), Comment 6 (chattel paper as a "semi-intangible security
interest").
142. See U.C.C. § 9-318(3). Notification of assignment (see note 28 supra) is sufficient to
entitle the assignee to be paid. Presentment is not required. See also U.C.C. § 9-308, Com-
ment 1 (second paragraph).
143. See note 138 supra, and accompanying text.
144. See note 142 supra, and accompanying text.
145. See notes 73-78 supra, and accompanying text.
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from U.C.C. § 9-318(1).141 Hence, while the implication from Willis-
ton's view is not rebutted by the letter of § 9-318(l), it is neverthe-
less rejected by the principle of law embodied therein. Neither the
law of assignment '47 nor the Code"" seems to adopt a specific theory
relating to non-negotiable instruments, except for the mode of their
transfer.
Hence, the scope of the defenses which are permissible against a
claim arising from consumer paper which is not governed by Article
3 ought to be determined by the principles of the law of assignment
of simple contracts.' Whether these principles are based on the
assumption that the mere existence of a statute of set-off is suffi-
cient to subject the assignee to collateral defenses,' 50 or whether they
embody the treatment of the Code with regard to the effect of these
defenses,'5 ' the conclusion is that in the hands of its purchaser con-
sumer paper which is not governed by Article 3 is subject to collat-
eral defenses.
E. Agreement to Assert Collateral Defenses
The last device to be considered here for subjecting financers to
collateral defenses relates to the contractual aspect of consumer
protection rather than to construing "defenses" in the applicable
legislation.
Obviously, parties to a contract for sale may agree to subject the
146. See notes 80-83 supra, and accompanying text.
147. See note 56 supra, and accompanying text. A writing which involved no security
interest has been characterized as non-negotiable and governed by the law of contract assign-
ment. See Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971).
148. Hence, the only reference in Article 9 to non-negotiable instruments is with regard
to their mode of transfer. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g); cf. U.C.C. §§ 9-304, -308 (dealing with
perfection but without affecting the premise that without taking possession of the instrument
the transferee cannot enforce the claim); U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (not applying to non-negotiable
instruments). U.C.C. § 3-805 applies only to one class of non-negotiable instruments.
149. It has been theorized that an instrument is a chattel governed by the law applicable
to chattels, as well as an obligation governed by the general law of obligations. See Barak,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper: An Outsider View, Part 1, 3 Is. L. Rav.
7, 16 (1968). Barak's views concern the negotiable instrument, but his general proposition
submitted above applies as well to any other instrument, including consumer paper. There
is, however, no specific reference in his research to the issue of the applicability of the general
law to the subjection of a holder to collateral defenses.
150. See note 98 supra, and accompanying text.
151. See notes 80-83 supra, and accompanying text.
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seller's claim to defenses of the buyer that arise from a separate
transaction.'5 These defenses would then be covered by U.C.C. § 9-
318(1) (a). They would affect the right of a holder of the instrument
evidencing the obligation of the buyer, regardless of the meaning
given to "defenses" under either U.C.C. § 3-306(b) or applicable
consumer credit legislation. 53
Our concern is focused, however, upon a consumer goods contract
which does not provide for it explicitly. To the extent that the
availability of collateral defenses can be implied into this kind of
contract, consumers are provided with an alternative technique for
protection. Admittedly, there are factual situations where such im-
plication can easily be inferred.'54 Whether courts may go further
and as a general rule introduce this kind of contractual term into
all consumer transactions is nevertheless doubtful.
While recent developments in the law relating to the contractual
aspect of consumer protection involve a growing tendency to enlarge
duties of sellers towards consumers,'55 a demarcation line ought to
separate matters relating to the subject matter of the underlying
contract from those which do not relate to it. It is only with respect
to the former that the expansion of sellers' liability is warranted.15
Obviously, regarding collateral defenses among matters of the first
group involves distortion of reality. Hence, implying a warranty
undertaken by the seller relating to performance of other contracts,
or implying otherwise the right to assert collateral defenses into the
underlying agreement, is an undue strain of legal concepts. 5 ' Conse-
quently, construing "defenses" in the applicable statute as exclud-
ing collateral defenses would leave the consumer unprotected with
respect to them, except when specific circumstances establish his
asserted right.
152. Such an agreement maybe binding even when made orally. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3),
(11), 2-202(b); note 43 supra.
153. See note 67 supra.
154. See note 45 supra (last sentence).
155. See, e.g., Model Act, note 47 supra, § 2.502(1) (defining "warranty").
156. See note 155 supra; U.C.C. §§ 2-312 through -315. See also the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (6),(7) (Supp. V
1975).
157. Likewise, it is hard to see the obligation of the seller under the collateral transaction
as a condition precedent for securing his rights upon the underlying contract. See generally
U.C.C. § 3-306(c).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The goal set forth in this article was the exploration, examination
and elaboration of the principles of law which determine the ques-
tion of subjecting purchasers of consumer paper to collateral defen-
ses. These are consumer defenses which arise against the seller out
of a separate and independent transaction from the financed con-
tract for sale, but which are nevertheless available against the claim
of the seller upon the financed contract. The discussion was based
upon the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and consumer
credit legislation dealing with the status of purchasers of consumer
paper, general principles of law and policies which prevail in the
consumer law field. It was argued that consumer paper retains its
identity as an instrument and that the question of the subjection of
its purchaser to collateral defenses should be disposed of according
to the law which governs rights upon instruments. Obviously, the
scope of the inquiry was limited to instances where a purchaser of
consumer paper is not a holder in due course thereof.
It was suggested in this paper that according to the U.C.C. a
holder not in due course might be held to take commercial paper
subject to collateral defenses. Assuming that this proposition was
rejected, alternative techniques for asserting collateral defenses
based on theories dealing with questions of title were examined. The
situation under consumer credit legislation which was discussed
afterwards basically involved the issue dealing with the nature of
consumer paper in relation to commercial paper covered by the
U.C.C. Subsequently a reference was made to the possibility of
viewing the right of the consumer to raise defenses stemming from
other transactions as being incorporated into the underlying sales
agreement.
The conclusion of this article is that as long as the use of consumer
paper is permitted, present commercial and consumer credit legisla-
tion, whether adopted or proposed, may be interpreted as subjecting
purchasers of consumer paper to collateral defenses. This is true
even though the question was ignored by most legislative schemes.
As for the extent of the permissible collateral defenses, once the
principle of their availability against financers is recognized, that
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is subject to determination by the various state laws.15 8 As such the
issue is beyond the scope of this article. It is submitted here, how-
ever, that a uniform determination of the range of these collateral
defenses might be desirable.**
158. See generally CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§ 679 et seq. (1947); CORBIN, supra note 43,
§§ 896-97. For citations to the various state statutes dealing with assignment and defenses
against an assignee see RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, at 322 et seq.
** The author wishes to thank Professor Andrew L. Kaufman of the Harvard Law School
for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.

